Dynamic Malware Analysis with Feature Engineering and Feature Learning by Zhang, Zhaoqi et al.
Dynamic Malware Analysis with Feature Engineering and Feature Learning
Zhaoqi Zhang1, Panpan Qi1, Wei Wang1
1National University of Singapore
zhaoqi.zhang@u.nus.edu, qipanpan@u.nus.edu, wangwei@comp.nus.edu.sg
Abstract
Dynamic malware analysis executes the program in an iso-
lated environment and monitors its run-time behaviour (e.g.
system API calls) for malware detection. This technique has
been proven to be effective against various code obfuscation
techniques and newly released (“zero-day”) malware. How-
ever, existing works typically only consider the API name
while ignoring the arguments, or require complex feature en-
gineering operations and expert knowledge to process the ar-
guments. In this paper, we propose a novel and low-cost fea-
ture extraction approach, and an effective deep neural net-
work architecture for accurate and fast malware detection.
Specifically, the feature representation approach utilizes a
feature hashing trick to encode the API call arguments as-
sociated with the API name. The deep neural network ar-
chitecture applies multiple Gated-CNNs (convolutional neu-
ral networks) to transform the extracted features of each API
call. The outputs are further processed through bidirectional
LSTM (long-short term memory networks) to learn the se-
quential correlation among API calls. Experiments show that
our solution outperforms baselines significantly on a large
real dataset. Valuable insights about feature engineering and
architecture design are derived from the ablation study.
1 Introduction
Cybersecurity imposes substantial economic cost all over
the world. A report (CEA 2018) from the United States gov-
ernment estimates that costs by malicious cyber activities in
the U.S. economy lay between $57 billion and $109 billion
in 2016. Malicious software (or malware) is one of the ma-
jor cybersecurity threats that evolves rapidly. It is reported
that more than 120 million new malware samples are be-
ing discovered every year (AV-TEST 2017). Therefore, the
development of malware detection techniques is urgent and
necessary.
Researchers have been working on malware detection for
decades. The mainstream solutions include static analysis
and dynamic analysis. Static analysis methods scan the bi-
nary byte-streams of the software to create signatures, such
as printable strings, n-gram, instructions, etc (Kruegel et al.
2005). However, the signature-based static analysis might
Copyright © 2019, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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be vulnerable to code obfuscation (Rhode, Burnap, and
Jones 2018) or inadequate to detect new (“zero-day”) mal-
ware (Vinod et al. 2009). In contrast, dynamic analysis al-
gorithms execute each software in an isolated environment
(e.g., a sandbox) to collect its run-time behaviour informa-
tion. By using behaviour information, dynamic analysis ex-
erts a higher detection rate and is more robust than static
analysis (Damodaran et al. 2017). In this paper, we focus on
dynamic analysis.
Among behaviour information, the system API call se-
quence is the most popular data source as it captures all the
operations (including network access, file manipulation op-
erations, etc.) executed by the software. Each API call in the
sequence contains two important parts, the API name and
the arguments. Each API may have zero or multiple argu-
ments, each of which is represented as a name-value pair.
To process behaviour information, a lot of feature engineer-
ing methods are proposed. For example, if we consider the
API name as a string, then the most N (e.g., 1000) frequent
n-gram features can be extracted (n = 1, 2, · · · ) from the se-
quence. However, it is non-trivial to extract the features from
the arguments of heterogeneous types, including strings, in-
tegers, addresses, etc.
Recently, researchers have applied deep learning mod-
els to dynamic analysis. Deep learning models like con-
volutional neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural net-
work (RNN) can learn features from the sequential data di-
rectly without feature engineering. Nonetheless, the data of
traditional deep learning applications like computer vision
and natural language processing is homogeneous, e.g., im-
ages (or text). It is still challenging to process the hetero-
geneous API arguments using deep learning models. There-
fore, most existing approaches ignore the arguments. There
are a few approaches (Tian et al. 2010; Fang et al. 2017;
Agrawal et al. 2018) leveraging API arguments. However,
these approaches either treat all arguments as strings (Tian
et al. 2010; Agrawal et al. 2018) or only consider the
statistical information of arguments (Ahmed et al. 2009;
Tian et al. 2010; Islam et al. 2013). They consequently can-
not fully exploit the heterogeneous information from differ-
ent types of arguments.
In this paper, we propose a novel feature engineering
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method and a new deep learning architecture for malware
detection. In particular, for different types of arguments, our
feature engineering method leverages hashing approaches
to extract the heterogeneous features separately. The fea-
tures extracted from the API name, category, and the argu-
ments, are further concatenated and fed into the deep learn-
ing model. We use multiple gated CNN models (Dauphin et
al. 2017) to learn abstract lower dimensional features from
the high dimensional hash features for each API call. The
output from the gated CNN models is processed by a bidi-
rectional LSTM to extract the sequential correlation of all
API calls.
Our solution outperforms all baselines with a large mar-
gin. Through extensive ablation study, we find that both fea-
ture engineering and model architecture design are crucial
for achieving high generalization performance.
The main contributions of this paper include:
1. We propose a novel feature representation for system API
arguments. The extracted features from our dataset will
be released for public access.
2. We devise a deep neural network architecture to process
the extracted features, which combines multiple gated
CNNs and a bidirectional LSTM. It outperforms all ex-
isting solutions with a large margin.
3. We conduct extensive experiments over a large real
dataset. Valuable insights about the feature and model ar-
chitecture are found through ablation study.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 introduces related work on malware detection. Section 3
shows the system of data collection. The methodologies in-
cluding feature representation and model architecture are
covered in Section 4. The experiments are demonstrated in
Section 5 and the conclusions follow in Section 6.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review the dynamic malware analysis
from the feature engineering and the deep learning perspec-
tives.
2.1 Feature Engineering for API Calls
(Trinius et al. 2009) introduce a feature representation called
Malware Instruction Set (MIST). MIST uses several levels
of features to represent a system call. The first level repre-
sents the category and name of the API call. The following
levels are specified manually for each API call to represent
their arguments. However, for different APIs, features at the
same level may indicate different types of information. The
inconsistency imposes challenges to learn patterns using ma-
chine learning models.
(Qiao et al. 2013) extend the MIST and propose a rep-
resentation called Byte-based Behaviour Instruction Set
(BBIS). They claim that only the first level (the category and
name of an API call) of MIST is effective. Besides, they pro-
pose an algorithm CARL to process consecutively repeated
API calls.
Statistical features are popular for training machine learn-
ing models. Strings from the API call’s name and its argu-
ments are extracted to calculate the frequency and distribu-
tion as the features in (Tian et al. 2010; Islam et al. 2010;
Islam et al. 2013). (Ahmed et al. 2009) also use statistical
features that capture both the spatial and temporal informa-
tion. Spatial information is extracted from arguments, such
as the mean, variance, and entropy. Temporal information
is from the n-gram API calls, including the correlation and
transformation possibility between two n-gram API calls.
(Salehi, Ghiasi, and Sami 2012) propose a feature repre-
sentation associating the API calls with their arguments. It
concatenates each argument with the name of its API call
to form a new sequence, However, this approach leads to an
extremely long feature vector and might lose the pattern of
API call sequence. (Hansen et al. 2016) propose another two
feature representations. These representations consist of first
200 API calls as well as its “argument”. However, this “ar-
gument” only indicates whether this API call is connected
with the later one, while ignoring the original arguments.
2.2 Deep Learning based Approaches
(David and Netanyahu 2015) treat the sandbox report as an
entire text string, and then split all strings by any special
character. They count the frequency of each string and use a
20,000-bit vector to represent the top 20,000 frequent ones.
Their model is a deep belief network (DBN) which consists
of eight layers (from 20,000-sized vectors to 30-sized vec-
tors). Cross-entropy loss is used to train the model. They
attain 98.6% accuracy on a small dataset with 600 test sam-
ples.
(Pascanu et al. 2015) propose a two-stage approach, a fea-
ture learning stage and a classification stage. At the first
stage, they use RNNs to predict the next possible API call
based on the previous API call sequence. At the classifica-
tion stage, they freeze the RNNs, and feed the outputs into
a max-pooling layer to transform features for classification.
They attain 71.71% recall rate at a false positive rate of 0.1%
on a dataset with 75,000 samples.
(Kolosnjaji et al. 2016) propose an approach which com-
bines CNN with LSTM. Their approach stacks two CNN
layers, and each CNN layer uses a 3-sized kernel to simulate
the 3-gram approach. After the CNN, an LSTM with a 100-
sized hidden vector is appended to handle the time-series
sequence.
The previous papers typically ignore arguments. (Huang
and Stokes 2016) use a feature representation with three
parts, the presence of runnable code in arguments, the com-
bination of the API call name with one of its arguments (se-
lected manually), and the 3-gram of API call sequence. This
feature representation is reduced from 50,000 to 4,000 by a
random projection. (Agrawal et al. 2018) propose a feature
representation with a one-hot vector from API call name and
top N frequent n-gram of the argument strings. The model
uses several stacked LSTMs that shows a better performance
than (Kolosnjaji et al. 2016). They also claim that multiple
LSTMs cannot increase the performance.
3 System Framework
To collect the run-time API calls, we implement the sys-
tem shown in Figure 1. The system has three parts, PE files
Figure 1: System Architecture
collection, behaviour information collection, and feature ex-
traction and model training.
3.1 PE Files Collection
The workflow of our system starts from the portable exe-
cutable (PE) files collection. In this paper, we focus on de-
tecting malware in portable executable (PE) file format in
Windows systems, which is the most popular malware file
format (AV-TEST 2017). This collection part has been im-
plemented by a local anti-virus company. In addition, the
company maintains a platform with 12 anti-virus engines to
classify the PE files. The classification results are aggregated
to get the label of each PE file for model training. Once the
model is trained, it will be added into the platform as the 13-
th anti-virus engine. After the collection, an execution queue
is maintained to submit the PE files for execution. It moni-
tors the storage usage and decides whether to execute more
PE files.
3.2 Behaviour Information Collection
Cuckoo1, an open-source software, is used to run the PE files
and gather execution logs. It executes PE files inside virtual
machines and uses API hooks to monitor the API call trace
(i.e., the behaviour information). Besides, Cuckoo simulates
some user actions, such as clicking a button, typing some
texts, etc. In our system, we maintain dozens of virtual ma-
chines on each server. All virtual machines are installed with
a 64-bit Windows 7 system and several daily-use software.
We leverage the snapshot feature of the virtual machine to
roll it back after execution. After execution, all generated
logs are stored locally on the Cuckoo server.
3.3 Feature Extraction and Model Training
The execution logs generated by the sandbox contain de-
tailed runtime information of the PE files, whose size ranges
from several KB to hundred GB. We design a feature engi-
neering solution (Section 4.1) that can run in parallel to ex-
1https://cuckoosandbox.org/
tract features from the raw execution logs efficiently. Once
the features are extracted, we train our deep learning model
(Section 4.2) on a model server with GPUs for malware clas-
sification.
4 Methodology
4.1 Feature Engineering
Most previous works (Qiao et al. 2013; Pascanu et al. 2015;
Kolosnjaji et al. 2016) neglect the arguments of the API
call, and only consider the API name and category. Con-
sequently, some important (discriminative) information is
lost (Agrawal et al. 2018). For example, the features of two
write operations (API calls) would be exactly the same if
the file path argument is ignored. However, the write oper-
ation might be benign when the target file is created by the
program itself but be malicious if the target file is a system
file. A few works (Trinius et al. 2009; Agrawal et al. 2018;
Huang and Stokes 2016) that consider the arguments fail to
exploit the heterogeneous information from different types
of arguments.
We propose to adapt the hash method from (Weinberger
et al. 2009) to encode the name, category and arguments of
an API separately. As shown in Table 1, our feature repre-
sentation consists of different types of information. The API
name has 8 bins, and the API category has 4 bins. The API
arguments part has 90 bins, 16 for the integer arguments and
74 for the string arguments. For the string arguments, several
specific types of strings (file path, Dlls, etc.) are processed.
Besides, 10 statistical features are extracted from all print-
able strings. All these features are concatenated to form a
102-dimension feature vector.
API Name and Category Cuckoo sandbox tracks 312
API calls in total which belong to 17 categories. Each API
name consists of multiple words with the first letter of each
word capitalized, such as “GetFileSize”. We split the API
name into words and then process these words by applying
the feature hashing trick below. For the API category, since
the category typically is a single word, for example, “net-
Table 1: Feature representation overview
Feature Type Details Dim
API name Strings Internal wordshashing trick 8
API category Strings Hashing trick 4
API
Arguments
Integers Hashing trick 16
Strings
Paths
Hashing trick
with hierarchy
16
Dlls 8
Registry
keys 12
Urls 16
IPs 12
String
statistics
numStrings, avLength,
numChars, entropy,
numPaths, numDlls,
numUrls, numIPs,
numRegistryKeys,
numMZ
10
work”, we split the word into characters and apply the fea-
ture hashing trick. In addition, we compute the MD5 value of
the API name, category and arguments to remove any con-
secutively repeated API calls.
We use feature hashing (Weinberger et al. 2009) in Equa-
tion 1 to encode a sequence of strings into a fixed-length
vector. The random variable x denotes a sequence of ele-
ments, where each element is either a string or a character.
M denotes the number of bins, i.e., 8 for API name, and 4
for API category. The value of the i-th bin is calculated by:
φi(x) =
∑
j:h(xj)=i
ξ(xj) (1)
where h is a hash function that maps an element, e.g., xj ,
to a natural number m ∈ {1, ...,M} as the bin index; ξ is
another hash function that maps an element to {±1}. That
is, for each element xj of x whose bin index h(xj) is i, we
add ξ(xj) into the bin.
API Arguments As for API arguments, there are only two
types of values, namely integers and strings. The individual
value of an integer is meaningless. The argument name is
required to get the meaning of the value. The same integer
value might indicate totally different semantics with differ-
ent argument names. For example, number 22 with the name
“port” is different from the one with the name “size”.
We adapt the feature hashing method (Weinberger et al.
2009) to encode the integer’s argument name as well as its
value, as shown in Equation 2. We use the argument name
to locate the hash bin. In particular, we use all the arguments
whose names’ hash value is i (i.e., h(xnamej = i) to up-
date the i-th bin via summation. For each such argument, we
compute the contribution to the bin as shown in Equation 2,
where ξ(xnamej ) is a hash function over the argument name
and xvaluej is the value of the integer argument. Because in-
tegers may distribute sparsely within a range, we normalize
the value using the logarithm to squash the range.
phii(x) =
∑
j:h(xnamej )=i
ξ(xnamej ) log(|xvaluej |+ 1) (2)
where h and ξ are the same hash functions as in Equation 1.
For strings of API arguments, their values are more com-
plicated than integers. Some strings starting with ‘0x’ con-
tain the address of some objects. And some other may con-
tain the file path, IP address, URL, or plain text. Besides,
some API arguments may even contain the content of an en-
tire file. The variety of strings makes it challenging to pro-
cess them. According to the previous work (Tian et al. 2010;
Islam et al. 2010; Islam et al. 2013; Ahmed et al. 2009), the
most important strings are the values about file paths, DLLs,
registry keys, URLs, and IP addresses. Therefore, we use the
feature hashing method in Equation 1 to extract features for
these strings.
To capture the hierarchical information contained in the
strings, we parse the whole string into several substrings
and process them individually. For example, we use “C:\”
to identify a file path. For a path like “C:\a\b\c”, four sub-
strings are generated, namely “C:”, “C:\a”, “C:\a\b”, and
“C:\a\b\c”. All these substrings are processing by Equation
1. The same processing method is applied for DLLs, reg-
istry keys and IPs. The DLLs are strings ending with “.dll”.
The registry keys often start with “HKEY ”. IPs are those
strings with four numbers (range from 0 to 255) separated
by dots. The parsing method is slightly different for URLs.
We only generate substrings from the hostname of the URL.
For example, for “https://security.ai.cs.org/”, the following
substrings will be generated “org”, “cs.org”, “ai.cs.org” and
“security.ai.cs.org”. In this way, the domain and organiza-
tion information will contribute more to the feature repre-
sentation.
Apart from the above specifics strings, there are lots of
other types of strings. Based on the previous work(Ahmed et
al. 2009; Tian et al. 2010; Islam et al. 2010), we extract sta-
tistical information from all the printable strings. The print-
able strings consist of characters ranging from 0x20 to 0x7f.
Therefore, all the paths, registry keys, URLs, IPs and some
other printable strings are included. One of the other types of
strings starts with “MZ”, which is often a buffer that contains
an entire PE file. Such strings usually occur in malicious PE
files such as thread injection(Liu et al. 2011). Therefore, we
additionally count the occurrences of “MZ” strings. A 10-
dimension vector is used to record the number of strings,
their average length, the number of characters, the entropy
of characters across all printable strings, and the number of
paths, DLLs, URLs, registry keys, IPs and “MZ” strings.
4.2 Model Architecture
We present a deep neural network architecture that leverages
the features from the proposed feature engineering step. Fig-
ure 2 is an overview of our proposed deep learning model.
Input module After feature engineering, we get the input
vector whose size is (N, d), whereN is the length of the API
call sequence, and d (102 bits) is the dimension of each ex-
tracted API feature. We first normalize the input by a batch
normalization layer (Ioffe and Szegedy 2015). This batch
normalization layer normalizes the input values by subtract-
ing the batch mean and dividing by the batch standard devia-
tion. It makes sure some dimensions of the feature vector are
Figure 2: An illustration of the proposed model
not so large to affect the training; it also has a regularization
effect, which is validated in the experiments.
Gated-CNNs module Several gated-CNNs (Dauphin et
al. 2017) are applied after the input module. Gated-CNNs
allows the selection of important and relevant informa-
tion (Yang et al. 2016) making it competitive with recurrent
models on language tasks but consuming less resource and
less time.
For each gated CNN, the input is fed into two convolution
layers respectively. Let XA denotes the output of the first
convolution layer, and XB denotes the output of the second
one; they are combined by XA ⊗ σ(XB), which involves
an element-wise multiplication operation. Here, σ is the sig-
moid function σ(x) = 11+e−x . σ(XB) is regarded as the
gate that controls the information from XA passed to the
next layer in the model.
Following the idea in (Shen et al. 2014), 1-D convolu-
tional filters are used as n-gram detectors. As Figure 2, we
use two gated CNNs whose filter size is 2 and 3 respectively.
All convolution layers’ filter size is 128, and stride is 1.
Bi-LSTM module All outputs from Gate CNNs are con-
catenated together. A batch normalization layer is applied to
these outputs to reduce overfitting.
We use bidirectional LSTM to learning sequential pat-
terns. The number of units of each LSTM is 100.
LSTM is a recurrent neural network architecture, in which
several gates are designed to control the information trans-
mission status so that it is able to capture the long-term con-
text information (Wu and Yan 2017). Bidirectional LSTM
is two LSTMs stacking together but with different direc-
tional input. Compared to unidirectional LSTM, bidirec-
tional LSTM is able to integrate the information from past
and future states simultaneously. Bidirectional LSTM has
been proved effective at malware detection by (Agrawal et
al. 2018).
Classification module After learning sequential patterns
from Bi-LSTM module, a global max-pooling layer is ap-
plied to extract abstract features from the hidden vectors. In-
stead of using the final activation of the Bi-LSTM, a global
max-pooling layer relies on each signal observed through-
out the sequence, which helps retain the relevant information
learned throughout the sequence.
After the global max-pooling layer, we use a dense layer
with units number 64 to reduce the dimension of the inter-
mediate vector to 64. A ReLU activation is applied to this
dense layer. Then we use a dropout layer with a rate of 0.5
to reduce overfitting. Finally, a dense layer with units num-
ber 1 reduces the dimension to 1. A Sigmoid activation is
appended after the dense layer to output the probability.
Our model is supervised with the label associated with
each input vector. To measure the loss for training the model,
binary cross-entropy function is used as Equation 3.
`(X, y) = −(y log(P [Y = 1|X])+(1−y)log(P [Y = 0|X]))
(3)
In addition, the optimization method we take is Adam,
and the learning rate is 0.001.
5 Experiments
5.1 Dataset
As described in Section 3.1, 12 commercial anti-virus en-
gines are set up to classify the PE file. We set a PE file as
positive if 4 or more engines agree that it is malicious. And
if none of the engines classifies it as malware, we set it as
negative. For other cases, we think the results are inconclu-
sive and therefore exclude them from our dataset.
Table 2: Summary of the data
Dataset Positive files Negative files
April 15931 11417
May 11856 21983
The collected data are archived by the date and we pick
two months (April and May) data to conduct our experi-
ments. All these PE files are processed by our system (as
shown in Figure 1) to collect the API call sequences. Table
2 is a summary of the data, where the row represents the
statistics of the data in a month.
5.2 Model evaluation
In order to investigate the performance improvement, we
compare the proposed model with three machine learning-
based models and three deep learning-based models.
• (Uppal et al. 2014) extract 3-gram vectors from API call
names. Then they use the odds ration to select the most
important vectors. SVM is applied as the model.
Table 3: The experimental results
Type Approach Arguments 4-fold CV Performance Test Performance Inference Time(ms/sample)AUC ACC Recall AUC ACC Recall
Machine Learning
Uppal et al. (Uppal et al. 2014) No 96.1808% 90.8922% 1.3745% 94.0211% 86.0071% 1.6092% 98.5575
Tian et al. (Tian et al. 2010) Yes 99.0966% 95.8322% 82.4162% 97.7732% 93.1798% 67.4472% 123.0334Fang et al. (Fang et al. 2017) 98.6166% 94.5826% 53.5148% 97.0195% 90.8757% 41.7190% 116.0063
Deep Learning
Pascanu et al. (Pascanu et al. 2015) No 95.3459% 89.0551% 9.1624% 50.6858% 32.2058% 0.6737% 94.2259Kolosnjaji et al. (Kolosnjaji et al. 2016) 98.8247% 95.3359% 59.4759% 97.5785% 93.3156% 42.4899% 92.1873
Agrawal et al. (Agrawal et al. 2018) Yes 99.0688% 95.8684% 77.7816% 98.1853% 94.8553% 60.1126% 257.5729Proposed Model 99.4640% 96.7637% 88.7535% 98.7123% 95.3328% 71.4831% 129.2115
(a) Validation ROC curve (b) Test ROC curve
Figure 3: Comparisons of ROC curve of different models
• (Tian et al. 2010) use a hash table to indicate the pres-
ence of strings. The strings come from both API names
and arguments. The generated hash table is then used as
features and the classifier is Random Forest.
• (Fang et al. 2017) use hashing trick to map the API call
names, return value and module name (a part of the ar-
guments) into some fixed-size bins. Then top important
features are selected and fed into XGBoost.
• (Pascanu et al. 2015) train a language model using RNN
which can predict the next API call given the previous
API calls. Then the RNN model is freezed and the hidden
features are extracted for malware detection. The input of
the model is a sequence of d-dimensional one-hot vectors
whose elements are all zeros except the position (the ele-
ment value is 1) for the corresponding API call.
• (Kolosnjaji et al. 2016) propose a model which combines
stacked CNNs and RNNs. The input is also one-hot vec-
tors for the API call sequence.
• (Agrawal et al. 2018) extract one-hot vectors from the
API call sequence and frequent n-grams from the API ar-
guments. The model uses several stacked LSTMs.
All the experiments are conducted against our dataset. We
use 4-fold cross-validation (or CV) over the April dataset to
train the models and do the testing over the May dataset.
Considering that new malware is being generated over time,
there could be many PE files for new malware in the May
dataset. Therefore, the performance indicates the model’s
capability for detecting unknown malware in a certain de-
gree.
Three metrics are considered: ROC (receiver operating
characteristic curve) AUC (Area Under the Curve) score,
ACC (accuracy) and Recall when FP (false positive) rate
is 0.1%. The recall is defined as the ratio of the cor-
rectly detected malware PE files over all malware PE files.
The FP rate is the ratio of benign PE files incorrectly
identified as malware. Anti-virus products are required to
keep a low false alarm rate to avoid disturbing users fre-
quently (Nicholas 2017). A good model should achieve a
high recall rate for a fixed low false positive rate. In addi-
tion, the inference time per sample, which includes the time
for feature processing and model prediction, is also taken
into account.
From the experimental results in Table 3, our proposed
model achieves the best AUC score, accuracy and recall
among all the baseline models at both CV and test dataset.
Figure 3 displays the ROC curve of all models. The
dashed curves are the ROCs of those traditional machine
learning models, while the solid lines are the ROCs of those
deep learning models. The experimental results illustrate
that the traditional machine learning approaches and deep
learning approaches are comparable. It should be noted that
the model (Tian et al. 2010) achieves quite good results by
using a basic method to extract the string information. This
indicates the importance of strings in feature processing.
Therefore, we spend a lot of effort on the feature engineering
of string data.
The results also show that models with argument features
generally outperform the ones neglecting arguments. The ar-
gument features increase the test AUC score of the tradi-
tional machine learning method by 3% and also increased
the test AUC score of deep learning by about 1%. Therefore,
including API arguments is necessary.
Figure 3 shows a margin between the results on validation
and test dataset. Since the training dataset is collected before
the testing dataset and new malware PE files are generated
over time, the test data is likely to include new malware PE
files that some models cannot handle correctly. However, our
proposed solution achieves the best performance on the test
dataset, which confirms the ability of our model in detecting
new and constantly evolving malware.
As for the inference time, models with the argument fea-
tures take a slightly longer time. However, since the infer-
ence time is far less than the time of feature processing, the
slightly longer inference time is still acceptable.
5.3 Ablation Study
The proposed model consists of several components that can
be flexibly adjusted, e.g., the Gated CNNs, Bi-LSTM and
Batch Normalization layers. In order to explore the effects of
different configurations, we employ several sets of compar-
ison experiments by fixing other structures and only chang-
ing the testing component. These result of these experiments
serve as the basis for the decision of our final model struc-
ture.
• Gated CNNs with three sets experiments, the Gated
CNNs only with kernel size 2 (2-GatedCNN), two
Gated CNNs with kernel size 2 and 3 (2,3-GatedCNN),
three Gated CNNs with kernel size 2, 3 and 4 (2,3,4-
GatedCNN).
• Bi-LSTM with three sets experiments, the model with
none Bi-LSTM, with one Bi-LSTM, and with two Bi-
LSTM stacked.
• Batch normalization layers with four sets experiments,
the model without any batch normalization (BN) layer,
with only the first BN layer (after the input), with only
the second BN layer (after the Gated CNNs), and with
both BN layers.
(a) Validation AUC (b) Test AUC
Figure 4: Comparison of AUC with different number of
Gated CNNs
Figure 4 depicts the comparisons for different numbers
of Gated CNNs. 2-GatedCNN converges slower although
the final performance is very close to the other two mod-
els. In addition, increasing the number of gated CNN from
2 to 3 does not bring any performance improvement. The
(a) Validation AUC (b) Test AUC
Figure 5: Comparison of AUC with different number of
Batch Normalization layers
(a) Validation AUC (b) Test AUC
Figure 6: Comparison of AUC with different number of Bi-
LSTM
best AUC score of 2-GatedCNN and 2,3-GatedCNN is
98.7964% and 98.8559% respectively. Therefore, we choose
2,3-GatedCNN in our model.
Figure 5 displays the performance with different numbers
of batch normalization layers. Although these four curves
tend to be closer at later epochs, the curve with both BN
layers shows slightly superior performance with the highest
AUC score at 98.7964%.
As for various numbers of Bi-LSTM, Figure 6 shows the
performance for each configuration. Obviously, in both fig-
ures, the curve of 0-Bi-LSTM is below the other two curves
by a large margin, which indicates the Bi-LSTM is vital.
The other two curves in both figures are continuously stag-
gered, however, 1-Bi-LSTM is slightly better with the high-
est point reaching 98.7964%. In addition, the computation
time of 1-Bi-LSTM is 2 times faster than 2-Bi-LSTM. Thus,
we choose 1-Bi-LSTM as the final configuration of the pro-
posed model.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a novel feature engineering method
and a new deep learning architecture for malware detection
over the API call sequence. Hashing tricks are applied to
process the heterogeneous information from API calls, in-
cluding the name, category and arguments. A homogeneous
and low-cost feature representation is extracted. Then, we
use multiple gated-CNNs to transform the high dimensional
hash features from each API call, and feed the results into
a Bi-LSTM to capture the sequential correlations of API
calls within the sequence. The experiments show that our ap-
proach outperforms all baselines. Ablation study over multi-
ple architecture variations verify our architecture design de-
cisions.
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